Background of the debate on qualitative and quantitative methods more

BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE ON QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS Eduard Bonet Universitat Ramon Llull. ESADE e-mail: eduard.bonet@esade.edu Hans Siggaard Jensen Learning Lab Denmark e-mail: hsj.lld@dpu.dk Oriol Iglesias Universitat Ramon Llull. ESADE e-mail: oriol.iglesias@esade.edu Alfons Sauquet Universitat Ramon Llull. ESADE e-mail: alfons.sauquet@esade.edu (Members of the Research Group GRACO) Paper presented at EURAM 2007 BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE ON QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS ABSTRACT The importance and meanings of the contemporary debate on quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences and management research comes out from the fact that the participants defend their ideas in the name of science. Discussions take place at different levels, from basic epistemological topics to current decisions and evaluations of scientific communities. They involve sub jects about what is science and what is a scientific theory and about what are the functions of quantitative and qualitative methods and what aspects of social world can be captured by each of them. The paper will focuss on the philosophical conceptual background of the debate and it will point out that the main concepts are considered in different ways: there are different notions of science and scientific theories; quantitative methods are defined some times as non-numerical methods and some times as interpretative methods of the meanings and purposes of social actors; finally quantitative methods include measurements, mathematical models and statistical inferences, which have different basics and rules. The first part of the paper will present a short historical overview on science and method. It will comment the geometry of Euclides and the Aristotelian physics, the legitimation of quantitative methods in the scientific revolution by Galileo and the mathematical physics of Newton; the qualitative approaches of Linnaeus and Darwin; the introduction of new scales of measurement and the creation of statistics; and the positivism of August Comte. The second part of the paper will introduce the contemporary debate on positivist and interpretativist methods. It will comment the evolution of positivism, and interpretativist approaches to the science of history; the phenomenological and hermeneutical justifications of interpretative methods in sociology; the criticism of measurement theory, the structuralist methods of the French school and the legitimation of narratives in social sciences research. That background will facilitate the development of further research about the debate. Key words: Positivist, classificatory and interpretative methods; and epistemology of science. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 1 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 INTRODUCTION Importance and meanings of the debate The importance of the contemporary debate on quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences and management research comes out from the fact that all contending parts are defending their positions and acting in the name of science. Radical positivist claim that only quantitative methods are scientific and that the use of some kinds of qualitative methods would corrupt science. Moderate quantitative researchers consider that there is nothing against qua litative methods and accept them for preliminary explorations, but they think that scientific research has to include mathematical models or hypothesis that can be submitted to statistical tests. In their opinion qualitative methods are insufficient and scientific research based only on them would trivialize and devaluate science. Finally, interpretative researchers defend that social sciences and management research deal with aspects of human conduct, which can only be understood with qualitative methods, and that, with them, we can interpret the meanings and the purposes of social actors. For these researchers, the basic approach has to be interpretative and the banishment of qualitative methods would mutilate, or even kill social sciences. These positions are splitting the main debate in many different discussions, which we will try to identify. Fights in the name of science are not fights in the name of God; but, even with the rational ideals and arguments of scientists, both struggles share many characteristics of passion, dogmatism and faith. Thomas Kuhn pointed out these aspects in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), when he was describing the change of paradigms. The debate on quantitative and qualitative methods goes on at different levels. At the philosophical level, we find deep epistemological studies, such as, for instance, the discussions on the scientific status of historiography, which started with the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), the criticism of classical science elaborated by Edmund Husserl (1858-1938) in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1954) and the inform about the present state of knowledge and science presented by F. Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition (1978). At the research level, we find the current activities, discussions and decisions of researchers, who are acting, as all of us, as gate keepers of the boundaries and quality of science. It happens every day; scientists, doctoral commissions, journals and institutions accept or reject research papers and dissertations taking in account as a main criterion if they use quantitative or qualitative methods. It is clear that this debate shapes the present and future development of social sciences and management research. Subjects and concepts involved in the debate The contemporary debate on what kinds of methods can be used, have to be used and cannot be used in social sciences takes place in the following historical setting, which we will present in a very simplified way: on the one hand, natural sciences, in the seventeenth century, legitimated, with very ha rd discussions, the use of quantitative methods in modern physics and provided the mathematical example of Newtonian mechanics. Following that path, for more than two centuries, scientists elaborated the positivist conception of empirical sciences, both for natural and social Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 2 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 research, which was formulated by Auguste Comte. On the other hand, social sciences are striving, since the nineteenth century, for the introduction and legitimation of interpretative methods, in front of the hostile and dominant positivist conceptions. The debate involves two kinds of subjects, which are closely related. The first kinds of topics focus on questions about science, suc h as what is science, what are its main characteristics and what is a scientific theory. The second kinds of topics focus on questions about method, such as what are the properties, functions, capacities and limitations of quantitative and qualitative methods and what aspects of the social world can be captured by each of them. The difficulties of these complex subjects are increased by the fact that there is not a general consensus on the basic concepts that intervine on the discussions. The basic concepts of epistemology are explicitly or implicitly defined in many ways: The concept of science not only has evolved along its history, but also nowadays it has many acceptations. In the knowledge society the idea of proven knowledge is reconsidered and in the post-modern condition the requirements of objective knowledge and objective observers is critically re-examined. In many disciplines, the classical notion of truth is replaced by the idea of practical applications. The concept of theory covers, in different scientific communities, a large variety of conceptual objects, which go from the hard structures of axiomatic deductive systems, such as those of classical geometry, Newtonian physics and Einsteinian relativity, to just soft common general ideas, conceptual frames and interpretations of meanings. Training on the construction of soft theories is so important that it is presented in courses and seminars on theory building, whereas hard structures are hardly ever discussed. The concept of qualitative methods has two main meanings. In some contexts it is equated with the notion of non-numerical procedures and it is associated to the use of categories and classifications, which can be objective or subjective. From them we will emphasize the objective -qualitative methods, which are found in many kinds of theories. In other contexts, the concept of qualitative methods is understood as subjective interpretative methods for the study of the meanings and motives of social actors. Also the concept of quantitative methods requires some comments and we will distinguish in them three main notions: first, the operations of counting and measuring, which we find in everyday life and in science; second, the models based on the theory of functions, which were introduced in the Newtonian mechanics; and third, the statistical procedures, which were iniciated in the nineteenth century and nowadays are very popular in social sciences. These forms of quantitative methods can be applied together and, in fact, many research papers integrate them. We have to remember, however, that they are justified by different logical considerations and involve different kinds of rules. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 3 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Approach to the debate and parts of the research paper Classical philosophical studies of the debate on quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences focus on the epistemological theories about what is science and what kinds of methods are scientific, in order to identify the relevant aspects of the discussions. Rhetoric of Science approaches complete these findings with the study of many actual debates, situating them in their historical and ideological contexts, pointing out the common topics and the specific prejudices of the contending parts, and emphasizing the means of persuation based on the arguments, the authority and credibility of the speakers and the mentality of the audiciences. Both kinds of approaches and specially the rhetorical approach involve a large number of topics and discussions which take place in many sciences and scientific communities. For these reasons, the present research paper, which opens an extensive research project, will only focus on the main philosophical conceptions of science and scientific methods that constitute the background of the debate. However it will situate these ideas in their ideological contexts and will point out some rhetorical aspects, which will facilitate the development of further studies. Following these lines of thought, the first part of the paper, will introduce a very short historical overview on the most relevant concepts of science and their position towards quantitative and qualitative methods. It will go from the classic Greek notion of episteme to the positivist doctrine of sociology and social sciences introduced by August Compte in the nineteenth century. This part will comment the following topics: The Greek philosophical concept of episteme, defined as objective knowledge that is true and whose truth has been rigorously proven, includes, among other sciences, the geometry of Euclides, which is quantitative even if it includes many theorems that are qualitative, and the physics of Aristotle, which is only qualitative. It is surprising for the contemporary mentality that in the modern scientific revolution of physics and astronomy, which took place in the seventeenth century, Galileo had to engage in hard debates for legitimizing quantitative methods. They were not accepted in the Aristotelian tradition. Newton closed that revolution with his impressive mathematical theory of mechanics. Even after Newton’s success, in the eighteenth century, some scientific theories such as the botanic and zoology of Linnaeus were developed using only qualitative classificatory methods; and, in the nineteenth century, Darwin produced his revolutionary theory on the origin of the species working almost only with qualitative methods and reducing measurement to some descriptions of different exemplars. Since the eighteenth century, the success of Newtonian physics led to many research approaches for measuring any kinds of phenomena, such as heat, light, magnetism and electricity and they produced important theories. In this way a new mentality was emerging. It considered that every thing or almost every thing can be measured, that the challenge of science is to measure any kinds of phenomena and that scientific theories have to include measurements and mathematical models. In the nineteenth century, quantitative methods extended their domains of applications from necessary properties and deterministic phenomena to the realm of contingent events that are regulated by probability laws. That extension opened the possibility of new kinds of quantitative research, both in natural and social sciences. For instance Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 4 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Mendel introduced his probabilistic laws in genetics and Poisson applied his distribution to the number of children and young people who committed suicide. Francis Galton, a cousin of Darwin, tried to give statistical support to the theory of the evolution of species. With this purpose he introduced the concept of regression. Finally Karl Pearson initiated the theory and practice of statistical tests. The axiomatic-deductive structure of geometry, the mathematical physics of Newton, the qualitative classifications of Linnaeus, the probabilistic models and the statistical methods influenced, one after the other, the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in moral sciences and moral philosophy, which were the antecedents of modern social sciences. August Compte, who has been an assistant professor of mathematics and physics, introduced the concept of positive science and founded the discipline of sociology, which he conceived as a physics for social phenomena. In his opinion, in natural sciences the laws of nature allow us to transform it, and in a similar way, we have to know the laws of society for modeling it. The second part of the paper will present the background of the debate on positivist and interpretativist methods in social sciences and management research. It will start with the subjective concepts of utility and marginal utility of the neoclassical economics. They were developed in a mathematical theory, which was accepted as scientific. At the same period, Dilthey defended that historiography is a science, which has to introduce subjective concepts, such as the projects and purpose of actors, but that approach was rejected. About fifty years after the general positivism of Comte, Ernst Mach developed the psychological positivism, which focused on perception and introduced the requirement that scientific theories can only introduce concepts related to observations. About fifty years after Mach, the neopositivism, logical positivism or empirical positivism of the Circle of Viena was emerging and dominated the epistemology of science from the 1930’s to the end of the 1950’s. In that line of thought, Carl Hempel claimed that the aim of historiography is to discover universal deterministic laws. Interpretative methods in sociology were introduced and legitimated by different authors. Alfred Schutz, a collaborator of Edmund Husserl, based them in the phenomenological approaches of experience and the objects of consciousness and he developed the interpretative ideas of Max Weber. Hermeneutics also contributed to the study of interpretative methods. New mathematics focused on the concept of mathematical structures and provided the basic instruments for the theory of measurement, which relates qualitative with quantitative properties. A scale of measurement represents qualitative relationships between objects using quantitative relationships between numbers, in the same way that a map represents a region using the geometric plane of a paper. In other words, measurement ties together a qualitative and a quantitative domain. New Mathematics also developed some subjects, such as binary relationships classifications and applications, which are basically qualitative. So, mathematics is not only a quantitative science but also a qualitative discipline. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 5 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Following the structural approach, the French structuralists Levi-Strauss, Foucault and Lacan introduced qualitative methods in social sciences, which are not based on the interpretations of the motives and aims of actors. Their approach was inspired on the structural linguistics of Saussure, the studies on pho nology of Hjelmsley and the classification of folktales of Propp, who followed the classificatory ideas of Linnaeus. Finally the second part presents the interpretativist approach of narratives in social sciences and management research. It is based on philosophy and phenomenology of history, cognitive psychology and literary studies. As narratives constitute a way for creating meanings, they become very important in management and management studies. FIRST PART A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON SCIENCE AND METHOD The concept of science in the Greek culture: Euclide’s Geometry and Aristotle’s Physics The Greek philosophy introduced the basic concept of episteme, defined as the kind of scientific and philosophical knowledge that fulfils the following conditions: it is objective, it is formulated in precise and not ambiguous propositions; these propositions are true and we have a rigorous proof of their truth. So that conception focusses on proven truth and does not take into account the fact that the propositions and the methods for discovering and proving them are quantitative or qualitative. To emphasize that property we can point out that the geometry of Euclides is a quantitative theory that includes many qualitative theorems and that the physics of Aristotle is only qualitative. Euclides’ Geometry Geometry is present in all primitive cultures as practical knowledge for measuring distances, areas and volumes. In the Greek world, it evolved towards a deductive science, and, in that line, Pythagoras (350 b.c.- ) is considered the founder of pure mathematics. That process culminated in The Elements of Euclides (330-277 b.c.), translated by Sir Thomas Heath and Published by Dover Classics of Science (1956). That text organizes geometry in an axiomatic-deductive form: in it the axioms or principles, which are not proven, are explicitly formulated and, from them, the theorems are rigorously proven by logic valid inferences. In that systems the truth of the geometrical propositions is established in two stages. First, the axioms, such as “each couple of points determines a straight line that joins them”, are considered evident in the sense that our mind immediately captures, without any argument, that they are true. Second, theorems are proven to be true, because the logical valid inferences transfer the truth of the axioms to them. The Elements of Euclides has been the basic reference on geometry untill the beginning of the nineteenth century. The creation of the mon-Euclidean geometries Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 6 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 and their applications to Einstein’s relativity have not changed the central roll of that classical book. As we will see, the methodology of axiomatic-deductive systems, with different justifications of the axioms, has constituted a model for developing natural and social sciences. Aristotle’s physics Aristotle (384-322 b.c.) in his Physis based the laws of motion, which m eant both physical displacement and biological evolution, on the concepts of potency and act, and illustrated them with the following example: an acorn is actually very small but it is potentially a very big oak. He approached the physical free-movement of the bodies from the nature of the elements. Nature is constituted by five elements: earth, water, air, fire and the fifth-essence. The sublunar world, in our terms the planet earth, has four elements, which are imperfect and corruptible; in it the natural movement is the straight line. Heavens, with the moon, the sun, the planets and the stars, is formed by the fifth-essence, which is a perfect and incorruptible element. Celestial bodies have a perfect spherical form and move uniformly in perfect circles. Each of the five elements has its proper place in the univers and when it is removed from it and then set free, it tends to go to its natural position. That principle explained both the phenomena of gravitation, or the downwards movement, and of levitation, or the upwards movement. In that conception physics is derived from ontology; research in that discipline does not involve observations, measurements and experiments but it consists on philosophical reflections about the nature of things. These reflections pretended to be objective but they gave to the elements, moving towards their natural places, a sort of intentionality. Modern natural sciences excluded these kinds of antropomorphical properties but interpretative methods in modern social sciences take into account the intentions of the social actors. Aristotle’s physics could seem, from a modern point of view, a fantasy, however Thomas Kuhn recognized that it was a well organized and complex ontological system. In the Greek culture there were other kinds of approaches not based on ontological speculations , which nowadays we consider scientific. Among them we can emphasize the quantitative methods used by Arquimedes (287-212 b.c.) for stablishing the laws of the levers and scales. However Aristotelian physics persisted in a long tradition, it was very influential since the thirteenth century and, at that time, it was incorporate to the doctrine of the Church. These facts explain the context of Galileo’s revolution and his problems with the Inquisition. Epistemological debates of the scientific revolution. Galileo, Descartes, Bacon and Newton It is well known that in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, Galileo (1564-1642), with his telecope, discovered mountains in the moon which contradict the statement of the geometrical perfection. He also established two principles that contradicted the Aristotelian physics. First, following the observations, and the mathematical model of the universe proposed by Copernicus (1473-1543), he claimed that actually the planets and the earth rotate around the sun. Second, he Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 7 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 stated that the earth rotates around itself. For that last claim he was accused by the Inquisition. As an anecdote, he used the classical geometric expression “the earth revolves around the sun” and after his story the concept of revolution adquired the modern meaning of social fight and change. Nowadays we take for granted that observations, m easurements and experiments are basic methods of the empirical sciences, however they have not always been accepted in physics. Their legitimation constitutes a main success of the scientific revolution. Galileo’s arguments for quantitative methods in physics Galileo claimed that the new physics was based on observations, measurements and experiments, but his position was not accepted by the Aristotelian theologists and natural philosophers, who presented two main objections: first, physics is about the nature of things and observational methods cannot discover anything about that nature. Second, observations, measurements and experiments discover individual facts or events that are expressed in individual propositions, but science is constituted by universal laws, which, therefore, are situated in a logical higher level than observation. In these grounds, for instance, many philosophers refused to look through out the Galilean telescope and rejected that the moon has mountains and craters and that Jupiter has moons, facts that destroyed the Aristotelian physics. Galileo tried to refute these objections. He presented in Il Saggatore, the following argument for measurement and mathematical laws: God has created the universe imposing to it mathematical laws that are written in the language of numbers and geometrical figures. Only if we use that language we can discover and understand them. He also presented the following argument for the foundation of empirical sciences, which covers both qualitative observations and quantitative measurement and which develops the Aristotelian concept of induction: the principle of induction, applied to a large number of observations allows us to discover universal laws and to justify that they are true. Once we have some laws, “proven” by induction, we consider them as axioms or principles of a deductive theory. The justification by induction was accepted by most of the modern scientists. Unfortunately, the criticism of Hume (1711-1776) proved that this principle cannot justify the truth of universal laws and it was not till the twentieth century that Karl Popper (1902-1994) proposed the principle of falsification as the foundation of empirical sciences. Descartes’ epistemological and scientific contributions Descartes (1596-1650) radicalized the requirements of proven knowledge in science and in philosophy and applied his method of doubt with the aim that he would not accept any claim that was not evident or rigorously proven. His programme situated epistemology and not ontology as the basic subject of philosophy and led him to the well known starting point “I think, therefore I exist”. We can relate that approach to his scientific findings and its implications in the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. He emphasized the axiomatic-deductive structure of Euclides’ geometry, which he promoted with the expression “Modus Geometricus [of reasoning]” and created the analytic geometry introducing the axis of coordinates. In that way the points of the plane, the straight-lines, the circumferences and the other geometrical Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 8 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 forms are represented by couples of numbers and equations. That new quantitative approach meant an important advance in reasoning for proving theorems and solving problems. We can say that analytic geometry is quantitative in a double sense: it deals with measurements of distances, areas and volumes, and its concepts are defined by numbers and equations Descartes also worked on empirical research based on measurements. For instance, in the book Reflexions on Method , whose complete title is Reflexions on Method, Optics, Geometry and Meteorology (1637) he formulated the geometrical laws of reflexion and refraction of light. However, as the father of modern rationalism, he claimed, in the line of Plato, that we posses some kinds of innate knowledge. So, he considered two kinds of knowledge: innate knowledge and empirical knowledge, which comes from observations, experiments and measurements. For him the quantitative approach of his analytic geometry belongs to the first class and his quantitative optical laws, as any kind of measurements and empirical findings, belong to a secondary sort of knowledge. On the basic subject of what is a scientific explanation, Descartes considered the Aristotelic theory of causality and claimed that a complete explanation has to present the material, formal and efficient causes. In that way he excluded the final causes because nature does not depend on the subjective aims of people and it does not have intentions. Final causes were reintroduced in the nineteenth century in the interpretativist approaches to social sciences. Francis Bacon and the new science Francis Bacon (1561-1626) exerced an important influence in the consolidation of the inductive ideas of the new science. The title of the book Novum Organum reflects his criticism of the Aristotelian works Organon, on logic and epistemology, and Physic, on the movement of celestial and earthly bodies. Bacon pointed out that Aristotle, starting some non systematic observations, induced the very general nature of the elements, and, from them, he deduced the laws of movement. In that way the classical method was almost reduced to logical deduction. Bacon emphasized that we have to use induction in very small generalizing steps and climb the inductive ladder rung by rung. Moreover, induction has to be based on a large number of observation, which he organized in tables of presence, absence and variation and described them in the following example: When we study the nature of heat, we have to look at all places and events, in which heat is present, is absent or it variates. For Bacon scientific research is not merely contemplative but its main aim is to transform the natural world and the conditions of human life. In that sense, Bertrand Russell in his History of Wester Philosophy considered him as the philosopher of the industrial revolution. However Bacon’s thought presents two main limitations: First, he ignored the functions of measurements and mathematical models in the new science and his methods were only qualitative. Second, he maintained the Aristotelian view that science is about the nature of things, when the news science was rejecting the ontological foundations of physics. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 9 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Newton and the methodology of mathematical physics Isaac Newton (1642-1727) in his work Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), published in 1687, closed the debates of the scientific revolution, created the paradigm of modern mechanics and consolidated it as a model for other disciplines. As his approach and his success had an enormous influence in the development of quantitative methods, both in natural and social sciences, we will point out some basic aspects of the epistemology that he explained in the book Optics (1703) and the methodology that we can appreciate in the development of his Principia Mathematica. Newton in his book Optics claimed that his theories were based on observations and measurements to which he applied the principle of induc tion. For him, that principle did not lead to mere hypothesis but to proven laws and he emphasized this view in his dictum “hypothesis non fingo” (“I do not make hypothesis”). He organized the Principia Mathematica as an axiomatic-deductive system, whose axioms are the laws named the Principles of Newton, supposedly proven by induction, and, from them, he deduced a large number of theorems. For almost two centuries, important physicistsmathematicians applied these methods for further developments of the Newtonian mechanics. We can emphasize that Newton introduced the Cartesian coordinates in order to represent the motion of a body as a function of time. That approach involved an important challenge; he had to create the modern theory of function or infinitesimal calculus and define its main concepts, such as those of derivatives and integrals. We will emphasize that he introduced quantitative methods at the following conceptual levels: First, empirical measurements. Second, definitions of concepts. For instance, for the notions of instantaneous velocity and acceleration, he introduced the first and second derivative of the function of motion. Third, formulation of his principles. For instance, his second principle states that the force that moves a body is equal to the mass of that body by its acceleration. Fourth, formulation of theorems, which are stated in mathematical equations. Fith proves of theorems, which are stablished by mathematical inference. Newton’s theory is deterministic in the sense that if we have a body and we know the forces that act on it in function of time and also its initial position, velocity and acceleration, we can determine its position at any further instant. Predictions can be very accurate. In that line of thought, the scientific and popular success of Newtonian mechanics was related, among other stories, to the following discovery: Comets were inpredictable and people in each culture considered them as ill omens or signs of God’s anger. Halley (1656-1742), a friend of Newton, collected astronomical observations of a comet from historical records and applied to them the laws of Newton for predicting the time of its next passage. Some years after, the comet, which was called Halley, appeared punctually in the skies. The triumph of the Newtonian physics meant a triumph of quantitative methods. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 10 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Linnaeus’s classificatory qualitative methods The success of Newtonian physics did not eliminate the qualitative approaches in natural sciences. The research of Linnaeus (1707-1788) on the classification of all living beings constitutes the most outstanding example of the scientific approach based on these kinds of qualitative methods. His problem was to understand the large variety of vegetal and animal species, which seemed to scape from any conceptual order. He approached that subject in the following way: after long observations and reflections on the plants that he took care at the Royal Botanic Gardens at Upsala, he identified their constitutive parts, such as roots, trunks, branches, flowers and fruits and he focused on the functions of each of them, such as the reproductive roll of flower. After that analysis he established a universal classification based on the presence or absence of some basic parts, for instance he distinguished between fanerogamus and criptogamus plants, or plants with and without flowers. The classifications of Linnaeus, such as those that he presented in the book Speces plantorum (1753), go on being taught in the high school education on biology of many countries. Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in 1833 embarked, as a natural scientist, in the Beagle for an expedition of five years, which went around the world and espent a long time in the costs and islands of Oceania and South America. He recorded his observations and reflection in his research journals. After that trip he expent almost twenty years working on his revolutionary theory of the evolution of the species, which he diffused in the book On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). He wrote that popular text for two kinds of audiences: his scientific peers, who could or could not accept it as a scientific theory, and the general readers, who would be exposed to the new ideas. He was able to reach both aims with the following decisions: he explained the main ideas in plain. English and avoided the most technical points. Darwin’s research had an important empirical part based on a large number of observations. However, it was almost qualitative and it reduced quantitative methods to measurements for describing variations of species, w ithout using mathematical methods or statistical inferences. At his time statistics was very limited in scientific research. The qualitative approach is clear not only in the popular book On the Origin of the Species but also in his research journals. Measuring new kinds of magnitudes After the success of Newtonian physics, scientists, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, introduced many scales for measuring phe nomena such as heat light, magnetism and electricity. We can illustrate the creative imagination put in that challenge commenting the measurement of the intensity of light on a point. That project required to precise, with qualitative observable criteria, two properties: When two intensities are equal; and when an intensity is the addition of two intensities. These properties characterize ration scales, such as those of length or distances, Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 11 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 areas, volumes, masses and forces. Researches solved that problem with the introduction of the optical scale. The optical scale is an instrument formed by a white screen with a visible small spot of oil. It can be illuminated from both sides by candles or luminic focus. If we put two candles, one at each side of the screen, at equal distances from the spot, and one of them produces more light than the other, them the spot seems white on one side and grey on the other side. In that context, we consider that the intensities of light that the spot receives on both sides are equal, if the spot seems invisible. When the spot receives an intensity of light from two candles in the same side that intensity is the addition of the intensities produced by each candle. The power of ratio scales for research is clear. In common sense observations we use vague expressions, such as “it is quite dark” and in science we measure the intensity of light, with photometers, even for taking photographies. So, the advantages of measurements at the level of precise descriptions is very impressive. The advantages of measurement are also impressive for the development of mathematical theories, which could not be created with qualitative descriptions. The modern developments of optics, thermodynamis, electricity, theory of waves and nuclear physics show the power of quantitative methods. Finally the scales of measurement in social sciences opened the door for statistical inferences. The success of measurements led to the mentality that almost every thing can be measured; that the progress of science involves the introduction of new scales of measurement; and that scientific theories require an important part of quantitative methods. The positivism of August Comte August Comte (1798-1857) studied in the famous École Polytechnique in Paris, which trained military engineers, with a very high level on mathematics and physics. They played important rolls on the management and development of French industry. Comte considered science as an element for transforming the social world and engaged in philosophical studies and social actions. From his ideas, which he developed in the Course of Positive Philosophy (1830-1842), we can present the following topics: For Comte knowledge has progressed in three main stages: the mythical or theological stage with, for instance, the Greek myths; the philosophical stage with for instance, Greek and modern philosophy; and the positive stage, with modern science. At that point we must remember, that for him the model of science was mathematics and physics. In that way he introduced the concept of positivism. Comte is also considered the father of sociology; he created and named that discipline as a kind of physic for the social world. He claimed that, in the same way that the scientific knowledge of the natural world allows us to modify it, we have to know the laws of society for transforming it. So, sociology was conceived as a positive science. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 12 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 SECOND PART ON POSITIVIST AND INTERPRETATIVIST METHODS On the subjective approaches of neoclassical economics and the interpretative methods of Dilthey The neoclassical economics, founded in the Austrian school by Carl Menger, in the English school by Jevons (1835-1882) and in the French-Swiss school by Walras (1834-1910), in the period 1871-1874, introduced the subjective concepts of utility and marginal utility and developed them, without effective measurements, in an impressive mathematical theory which used the concepts of function, derivative and integral. Even if the basic concepts were subjective, that theory, formally similar to the Newtonian physics, was accepted as objective. Almost at the same period, in 1883, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) published his Introduction to the Science of the Spirit. In it he tried to establish the scientific status of historiography and claimed that social sciences deal with human action, which can only be understood in terms of projects and intentions of actors. These kinds of interpretative methods were rejected. On the evolution of the positivism Also in 1883, Ernst Mach (1838-1916) published his book on epistemology of physics Mechanics presented in its Historical-Critical Development. The positivism of March is centered in the psychology of perception and in the idea that we have to reject concepts that are not related to observations. His criticism of the Newtonian physics was recognized by Albert Einstein as an important contribution to the ideas that led to the principles of relativity. For a long period of the twentieth century, from the thirties to the end of the fifties, epistemology of science was dominated by the neopositivism, logical positivism or empirical positivism of the Cercle of Viena. It focused on the logical language of theories in order to avoid expressions that have not sense and on the empirical condition that concepts have to be related to observations in order to eliminate metaphysical claims. In that line of thought, Hempel proposed a theory of historiography as a science that looks for universal laws, similar to physics, and rejected the interpretativist methods. On phenomenology and the justification of interpretative methods Max Weber (1864-1920), who was influenced by the works of Carl Menger, introduced with the concept of Verstehen, interpretative methods in sociology. Alfred Schutz (1899-19599), a collaborator of Edmund Husserl (1858-1938), the father of phenomenology extended the ideas of Weber and founded them in the phenomenological study of the experience and the objects of our consciousness. In his paper “Common sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action” (1954), he distinguishes two levels of interpretations: the meanings that actors give to the world and the scientific interpretations of researche rs; he points out that we can only Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 13 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 understood the actions of people if we can interpret their motives and purposes; and he legitimates the use of interpretative methods in social sciences. On hermeneutics and the justification of interpretative methods Christian hermeneutics has a very long tradition on the interpretation of the Bible, which was written in hebreu, in a culture and with literary conventions that are different from those of Greek and Latin Western tradition. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, hermeneutics was transformed into a philosophical discipline dealing with the general problems of the interpretations of texts. In it, for instance Schleiermacher introduced the idea of the hermeneutic circle, or the feed-backs between the meaning of each word and the meaning of the sentence and Dilthey emphasized the feed-backs between the meaning of each part of the text and the meaning of the full text. With de metaphor “reading an action”, which points out an analogy between interpreting a human action and reading a text, hermeneutics became a basic instrument for the legitimation of interpretative methods in social sciences. The title of Gadamer’s (1900-2000) book Truth and Method reflects the interest for the methodology of social sciences. The hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches to social sciences share their main ideas; their difference is not conceptual but comes out from their emphasis and historical development. So we have two main positions on the debate on methods: the positivist and the interpretativist. However, in sociology we have also to mention the structuralist approach. On the relationships between qualitative and quantitative methods: theory of measurement and new mathematics In the twentieth century, the introduction of new mathematics, which is based on the theory of sets and deals with mathematical structures, had important consequences for the concepts of quantitative and qualitative methods. On the one hand, it provided the basic notions for the logical and philosophical theory of measurement. In that theory, a scale of measurement involves a domain of qualitative elements, relationships and compositions; a domain of numbers, and numerical relationships and operations; and an isomorphism that represents the first domain in the second. In other terms, a measurement ties together a qualitative and a quantitative world. The qualitative properties, relationships and compositions can be objective, as it happens in many physical scales, or subjective, as we find in the notions of utility and preference. The theory of measurement also introduces nominal, ordinal, ratio and interval scales, whose use is discussed in the debate on quantitative and qualitative methods. On the other hand, new mathematics introduced concepts, such as binary relations and applications, which in general are qualitative and only in particular cases are defined in sets of numbers. In other words, mathematics has extended its field of study into qualitative domains. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 14 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 Structuralism and qualitative methods in social sciences In the decade of 1960’s, the French structuralists and post-structuralists Levi-Strauss Barthes, Foucault (1926- ) and Lacan (1901-1981) become a main reference in social sciences. They had developed a qualitative methodology, which is not based on the interpretation of the meanings of the actors. Their methods were inspired in Saussure’s (1857-1913) structural linguistics, Hjelmsley’s (1899-1965) studies on phonology, and Propp’s classifications of tales. Saussure in his revolutionary work Cours of General Linguistics (1916) emphasized that the linguistic elements have to be defined not by their nature but by their relationships with the others. In this way each concept depends on the structure to which it belongs. Hjelmsley studied the phonemes of each language using a universal finite set of characteristics, such as the binary distinctions vocal- non vocal, labial-non labial, guteral-non guteral. These kinds of distinctions define phonemes as classes of physical sounds. Vladimir Propp, a Russian formalist or structuralist, in The Morphology of Folk Tales (1926) classified these kinds of tales, following the classificatory methods of Linnaeus on botanic and the recommendations of Goethe on the interest of creating a general science of morphology. All these kinds of methods, which are based on the concepts of classifications and structures, constitute the basic instruments of the French structuralists. Levi-Strauss’s research on The Elementary Structures of Kindred Relations (1949) is a very good example of the structural approach and his book Tristes Tropiques (1955) opened a new form of scientific writing, based on narratives. On the interpretative methods of narratives in social sciences Among the interpretative methods and their phenomenological and hermeneutical legitimations, the case of narratives in social sciencies and management research deserves an especial attention. We can situate its specific characteristics in the convergence of philosophy and phenomenology of historiography, in the line of Dilthey, cognitive psychology and literary studies. On philosophy of historiography, Hayden White in The Content of the Form. Narrative Discurse and Historical Representation (1987), points out three kinds of history writings: annals, chronicles and stories. Annals, for example the Annals of Saint Gall of the eight centur y, present the main events of each year isolated, without interpreting and relating them. Of course that is not our normal way of thinking and it could be considered as a mne motechcnic devise. However, from an analytic point of view, the reports of these events can be seen as basic logical propositions for building a positivist theory. The chronicles, for example the chronicles of medieval kings, interpret and relate events around an elementary plot, but they do not have a proper ending. Stories posses a complete plot and an ending. These narrative elements give meanings to the basic events. For White, the job of common people and especially of historians is to give meaning to the events, organizing them, through the operation of emplotment, which situate them in a plot with an ending. Phenomenology of history studies how the sense of historicity is formed in our experience, how the sequence of time organizes events in temporal relationships, Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 15 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 which are related to causality, and how our memory selects the mental events of our consciousness. Paul Ricoeur’s book Memory, History and Forgetness (2000) is a good example of that approach. Jerome Bruner, one of the fathers of cognitive psychology and cognitive science, in his book Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (1986) claim that there are two ways of thinking, formulating knowledge and communicating: the logico-scientific mode of knowing and the narrative mode of knowing. They are complementary posses different characteristics and capture different aspects of the social world. A main topic of literary criticism is about the meanings of a text and the forms of reading it. Traditional schools focus on the forms of reading that try to get the meaning intended by the author. New Criticism, represented by Northrop Frye, looks for the meaning of the text in itself, without reference to the intentions of the author. Other school focus on the meanings created by the readers. Deconstructivists deconstruct the text in order to find other meanings. In that way literary theory becomes very close to the hermeneutics of texts and human action. Management studies are focussing more and more on the activities of creating meanings and sense making. Opportunities are not objects that lay up there waiting for some body who will pick them up. Opportunities are created when we give meanings to the situations. Organizational life and behavior constantly give meanings to the work relationships of people. The importance of narratives in management and management research comes out from the facts that story telling is a way of creating meanings and story interpretation is a form of discovering the meanings of the social and corporate actors. CONCLUSIONS From the point of view of the actual development of science, the historical sketches have pointed out important contributions of quantitative and qualitative methods. On the qua ntitative domain we cannot dismiss the mathematical models of Newtonian physics or modern econometrics, and the statistical inference, in natural and social sciences. On the qualitative domain, we cannot dismiss the classifications of Linnaeus, the natural selection of Darwin, the structuralist approaches of linguistics and sociology the interpretative studies of human actions and the narratives in social sciences. Without quantitative and qualitative methods, modern science and modern thought would not be what it is. From the point of view of the legitimacy of quantitative and qualitative methods in their fields of applications, we have considered important arguments. In the domain of quantitative methods, Galileo claimed that God wrote the book of nature in mathematical terms and , therefore, we need quantitative methods to understand them. Nowadays with think in terms of mathematical models that are very productive. In the domain of qualitative methods classification are universally accepted and the arguments for interpretative methods as necessary for understanding human action are important. Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 16 Paper presented at EURAM 2007 From the point of view of the actual arguments and decisions that are going on, it is important to point out the following three aspects: first, the debate on quantitative and qualitative methods will go on for many years and discussions on science will go on for ever. Second, the debate is not always clearly defined and depends on different conceptions of science and qualitative methods, which are not clearly stated. Third, the debate takes place in different disciplines and scientific communities, which decide their own criteria for acceptable research. The debate requires more research work, both on its epistemological position and actual rhetorical discussions. The present paper only introduces the background. Bibliography (to be added) Bonet et al (2007) - EURAM 17